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Part I of this Essay shows that two central principles of the EC, namely mobility between
Member States and decentralization of economic policies (subsidiarity), imply that Member States
and other lower-level jurisdictions necessarily are in competition with one another (locational
competition). Part II presents an outline of a theory of interjurisdictional competition that suggests,
first, that only a competitive system of jurisdictions can be compatible with both decentralization
and mobility and, second, that interjurisdictional competition may be a superior way of supplying
public goods and services. Part III argues that the institutional structure of the EC has failed to take
into account the dimension of locational competition among jurisdictions, thus leading to an often
unwanted tendency to centralization. Alternatively, Part III suggests an integrated set of rules for
competition that protects both competition among firms and interjurisdictional competition within
the Community.
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INTRODUCTION
The tensions between the additional shifting of compe-
tences for economic policies from the Member States level to the
European Community ("EC" or "Community") level, and in-
creasing desires of the EC population for decentralization and
preservation of regional diversity, both seem to grow. The de-
bate on the principle of subsidiarity shows their growth. The ap-
proaching enlargement of the Community will increase the het-
erogeneity of the Member States and further aggravate this prob-
lem. The question therefore arises, how can the institutional
structures of the EC be reformed in a way that both the Commu-
nity's central aim of an internal market, and decentralization
and diversity within the EC, are simultaneously achieved?
It is not possible to suggest an elaborated answer in this Es-
say, but the following reason should call attention to an impor-
tant dimension of this problem, which up until now seems to
have been neglected: competition among jurisdictions. Part I of
this Essay shows that two central principles of the EC, namely
mobility between Member States and decentralization of eco-
nomic policies (subsidiarity), imply that Member States and
other lower-level jurisdictions necessarily are in competition with
one another (locational competition). Part II presents an out-
line of a theory of interjurisdictional competition that suggests,
first, that only a competitive system of jurisdictions can be com-
patible with both decentralization and mobility and, second, that
interjurisdictional competition may be a superior way of supply-
ing public goods and services. Part III argues that the institu-
tional structure of the EC has failed to take into account the
dimension of locational competition among jurisdictions, thus
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leading to an often unwanted tendency to centralization. Alter-
natively, Part III suggests an integrated set of rules for competi-
tion that protects both competition among firms and interjuris-
dictional competition within the Community.
I. THE PROBLEM: DECENTRALIZATION + MOBILITY =
INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
The EC Member States still have many competences regard-
ing economic policies, but in the last several years there has
been a clear tendency toward a growing centralization. The Eu-
ropean Monetary Union will even further strengthen centraliza-
tion. The problem of increasing centralization within the EC is
one of the most debated issues of European integration. The
respective dangers seem to be bureaucratization, rent-seeking
through lobbyismus on the EC level, and failing responsiveness
to the preferences of the constituents.1 The concerns about this
development have led to the introduction of the principle of
subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty,2 and are stressed again in
the Treaty of Amsterdam.3 Consequently, the process of Euro-
1. See, e.g., BRUNO S. FREY', EIN NEUER F6DERALISMUS FOR EUROPA: DIE IDEE DER
FOCJ (1997); Roland Vaubel, The Centralisation of Western Europe: The Common Market,
Political Integration, and Democracy, Institute of Economic Affairs, Hobart Paper, 127
(1995).
2. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, [hereinafter EEC Treaty] as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA]).
3. See Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportion-
ality in the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the TEU, the Treaties establishing the Euro-
pean Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79
(1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. See also C. KOENIG & A.
HARATSCH, EUROPARECHT 26 (2d ed. 1998). For a discussion on the importance of the
principle of subsidiarity for the institutional structure of the European Community
("EC" or "Community") from a legal or economic perspective, see Nicolas Bernard, The
Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity, 33 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 633 (1996); Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf?, in LEGAL
ISSUES OF THE MAAsTRIcHT TREATY 65 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds.,
1994); Karl Homann & Christian Kirchner, Das Subsidiaritiitsprinzip in der Katholischen
Soziallehre und in der Okonomie, in EUROPA ZWISCHEN ORDNUNGSWETTBEWERB UND
HARMONISIERUNG: EUROPAISCHE ORDNUNGSPOLITIK IM ZEICHEN DER SUBSIDIARITAT 45 (L.
Gerkin ed., 1995); Christian Kirchner, The Principle of Subsidiarity, in the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union: A Critique from a Perspective of Constitutional Economics, 6 TUL. J. Iier'L &
COMP. L. 291 (1998) [hereinafter Kirchner I]; Christian Kirchner, Europdisches Vertrag-
srecht, in EUROPAISCHES VERTRAGSRECHT 103 (H.L. Weyes ed., 1997) [hereinafter Kirch-
ner II]; Christian Kirchner, Competence Catalogues and the Principle of Subsidiarity in a Euro-
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pean integration now seems to be explicitly linked to the idea
that decentralization should be preserved as far as possible.
Whereas the decentralization issue is rather new and still
controversial, the facilitation of mobility between the Member
States has been a longstanding central aim of the EC. The re-
moval of all obstacles to the free flow of goods, services, persons,
and capital has been the basic thrust of the program for the
completion of the Internal Market, which has been realized step
by step since the 1980s. Because the original idea of removing
all non-tariff barriers to trade within the EC through harmoniza-
tion could not be carried out, the concept of "mutual recogni-
tion,"4 has been applied to many national regulations, which
previously impeded the free movement of goods, services, per-
sons, and capital. Without discussing the highly differentiated
and complex outcome of this development, including the vari-
ous provisions of the Member States, most existing barriers have
been torn down, leading to a sharp increase in the mobility of
individuals, firms, goods, services, and production factors within
the EC.5 Rapid technical progress in transport and communica-
tion technologies has also increased their mobility.
pean Constitution, in 8 CONST. POL. ECON. 71 (1997) [hereinafter Kirchner III];
Wernhard M6schel, Zum Subsidiaritatsprinzip im Vertrag von Maastricht, 47 NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3025 (1993); Mathias Rohe, Binnenmarkt oder Interessenverband?
Zum Verhaltnis von Binnenmarktziel und Subsidiaritatsprinzip nach dem Maastricht-Vertrag, 61
RABELS ZEITSCHRiFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 1 (1997);
Hans-Werner Sinn, How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition,
41 SCOT. J. POL. ECON. 85 (1994); Josephine Steiner, Subsidiarity Under the Maastricht
Treaty, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 49 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M.
Twomey eds., 1994); Akos G. Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1079 (1992). For an example of how economic criteria can be
used to apply the subsidiarity principle in the EC for competition policy, see Roger Van
den Bergh, Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the European Commu-
nity: The Case of Competition Policy, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 363 (1996).
4. The European Court ofJustice developed the concept of mutual recognition, or
principle of origin, in the famous "Cassis de Dijon" decision. Rewe v. Bundesmono-
polverwaltung fur Branntwein, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494.
The development continued in the Commission's White Paper on the Internal Market.
5. See generally JAMES D. DINNAGE &JOHN F. MURPHY, THE CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 430 (1996); Rohe, supra note 3, at 12; Piet Jan Slot, Harmonisa-
tion, 21 EUR. L. REv. 378 (1996); Manfred E. Streit & Werner Mussler, The Economic
Constitution of the European Community-From "Rome" to "Maastricht", 5 CONST. POL. ECON.
319 (1994); Stephen Weatherill & Paul Beaumont, EC LAw 490 (2d ed. 1995). For a
recent account of the state of the internal market, see Kamiel Mortelsman, The Common
Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market, What's in a Market?, 35 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 101 (1998).
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As a consequence of enhanced mobility, competition
among firms within the EC has intensified considerably, i.e.,
many previously national markets have turned into European
markets in which firms from different Member States compete
with one another. More important, not only goods and services,
but also individuals, firms, and capital can move much more
freely between Member States while looking for the most attrac-
tive location for their investments. From an economic perspec-
tive, the free movement of individuals, firms, and capital can be
seen as leading to the efficient spatial allocation of resources
such that all factors of production move to the locations of their
highest productivity. This kind of mobility implies that the dif-
ferent locations in the EC, and therefore the respective Member
states, regions, 6 and municipalities as well, must be viewed as be-
ing in competition with one another because the influx of re-
sources usually has wealth-enhancing effects leading to more
jobs and an extension of the tax base.
The attraction of territorially defined state units, or 'juris-
dictions," for mobile individuals, firms, and productive re-
sources, and hence their competitiveness, depends on many de-
terminants. Although the requirements for locations differ
among the firms and their respective type of production, the fol-
lowing determinants may be relevant: natural conditions, law,
regulations, bureaucracy, taxes, infrastructure, political stability,
human capital of the workforce, wages, etc. Consequently, the
competitiveness of locations not only depends on natural condi-
tions, but also to a large degree on the economic policies of the
jurisdictions themselves. An extensive and well-maintained in-
frastructure in the form of motorways and airports can be as im-
portant an advantage for firms as is a well-educated, competent
workforce or a flexible bureaucracy that does not block invest-
ments by a narrow-minded application of regulations. Since eco-
nomic policies ofjurisdictions can influence the competitiveness
of their territory as a location for mobile individuals, firms, and
factors of production, the jurisdictions compete with one an-
other with respect to their policies, especially for the attraction
of new firms/new investments.
This kind of competition among Member States, regions, or
6. A region is an area undefined by national boundaries. For example,
Bundeslinder is a region in Germany and Austria.
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municipalities can be observed in many ways. One form is the
bidding of jurisdictions for the establishment of new firms by
offering subsidies or other specific advantages to the firms,
which would be a case for state aid policy by the Commission.
But there are many other forms as well. Any economic policy
that tries to improve the locational conditions of the jurisdiction
must be seen in the context of these competition processes. De-
regulation, the extension of infrastructure, the improvement of
the performance of the public sector or the legal system, invest-
ments in universities and scientific research, and reductions in
taxes, are measures that can improve the competitiveness of the
respective jurisdiction. Consequently, the increasing mobility,
which has been facilitated by removing the barriers to the free
movement of goods, services, persons, and capital, has led not
only to an increasing competition among firms, but also to con-
siderable competition among Member States, regions, and mu-
nicipalities within the European Union.
How do the competition processes among jurisdictions fit
into the overall concept of European integration? Our conten-
tion is that up until now they are not seen as being an integral
part of the process of European integration, although nobody
would deny the existence of such a competition. It seems rather
that advocates of European integration have a hostile attitude
toward the idea of competition among jurisdictions. But here
we want to call attention to the conclusion that if we do not want
this competition, then only two main strategies remain for its
elimination. The first strategy would be the reduction of mobil-
ity through the reestablishment of obstacles to mobility. But the
tearing down of these barriers and the creation of an internal
market in the EC has been one of the central ideas of European
integration. The second strategy would consist of eliminating
the decentralized competences of Member States, regions, and
municipalities to decide freely on their economic policies, be-
cause through either harmonization, i.e., cartelization, or cen-
tralization of economic policies, the jurisdictions would lose
their instruments for competing with one another. But this
strategy would deny the possibility of decentralization as a sec-
ond central principle of European integration. The core of the
problem is that simultaneous realization of mobility and decentraliza-
tion logically implies the existence of competition among jurisdictions.
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II. A NEW APPROACH: COMPETITION
AMONG JUPSDICTIONS
A. Introduction
Competition among jurisdictions, or interjurisdictional
competition, can be seen as a new theoretical approach that ana-
lyzes the competition processes among territorially defined units
such as states, regions, and municipalities. Older roots of this
approach are Charles Tiebout's market solution for the provi-
sion of local public goods7 and the economic theory of federal-
ism, especially new developments such as competitive federal-
ism.8 With regard to the problems of European integration,
globalization, and locational competition, interjurisdictional
competition has been discussed under different headings, such
as "systems competition," "institutional competition," "locational
competition," or "competition among governments."9 Despite
7. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
8. See ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITVE GOVERNMENTS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLI-
TICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE (1996) [hereinafter Breton I]; Albert Breton, Towards a Theory
of Competitive Federalism, 3 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 263 (1987) [hereinafter Breton II];
THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990);
COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQurry IN AMER-
ICAN FEDERALISM (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
9. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics ofJurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. LJ. 201 (1997);
Breton I, supra note 8; Breton II, supra note 8; DYE, supra note 8; Bruno S. Frey &
Reiner Eichenberger, Competition Among Jurisdictions: The Idea of FOCJ, in COMPETITION
AMONG INSTITUnONS 209 (L. Gerken ed., 1995); FRE, supra note 1; Konstantine Gatsios
& P. Holmes, Regulatory Competition, in 3 THE NEW PALCRAE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAw 271 (P. Newman ed., 1998); H. Hauser & M. H6sli, Harmonization orRegu-
latory Competition in the European Community, 46 AUSSENWmRTSCHAFT 497 (1991); Kenyon
& Kincaid, supra note 8; Wolfgang Kerber, Zum Problem einer Wettbewerbsordnungfir den
Systemwettbewerb, 17JAHRBUCH FUR NEUE POLInSCHE OKONOMIE 199 (1998) [hereinafter
Zum Problem]; Wolfgang Kerber, Erfordern Gtobalisierung und Standortwettbewerb einen
Paradigmenwechsel in der Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik? in 49 ORDO 253 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Erfordern Globalisierung]; Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Policy in the European Com-
munity: Harmonization or National Standards, 25 EMPiRICA 1 (1998); Wallace E. Oates &
Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition AmongJurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distor-
tion Inducing?, 35J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); LOCATIONAL COMPETTION IN THE WORD
ECONOMY (Horst Siebert ed., 1995); Horst Siebert & Michael J. Koop, Institutional Com-
petition: A Concept for Europe?, 45 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 462 (1990); Hans-Werner Sinn, The
Limits to Competition Between Economic Regimes, in 17 EMPijcA-AusTRIAN ECONOMIC PA-
PERS 3 (1990) [hereinafter Limits to Competition]; Sinn, supra note 3; Hans-Werner Sinn,
Implikationen der vier Crundfteiheiten fur eine nationale Fiskalpolitik, in WIRTSCHAFrSDIENST
240 (1995); Hans-Werner Sinn, The Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems Compe-
tition (MS), in Journal of Public Economics (forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter Selection Princi-
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rapidly expanding literature on these rather heterogeneous ap-
proaches, they are still barely elaborated on, both on theoretical
and empirical grounds.'0 The common basic idea is that the in-
creasing mobility of individuals, firms, and capital may allow the
market approach also to be applied to the provision of institu-
tions and other public goods and services throughout jurisdic-
tions.
From the individualistic perspective of Constitutional Eco-
nomics, the normative point of reference is the voluntary con-
sent of individuals1 and therefore the fulfillment of their prefer-
ences. Since not all problems can be solved by private produc-
tion (private goods), agencies with coercive power are necessary
to overcome prisoners' dilemmas in the provision of public
goods. 12 But how can it be ensured that the activities of such a
state as a monopolist will fulfill the preferences of its constitu-
ents? Since the political system works imperfectly in controlling
governments, rent-seeking problems (public choice) and knowl-
edge problems have been elaborated as central problems of eco-
nomic policy, leading to the recommendation of limiting the
power of government by constitutional constraints and restrict-
ing economic policy to the rule of law.'" An alternative ap-
proach, which can be seen as complementary to these proposals,
is the idea that competition among states can help both to con-
fine the discretionary power of governments and to alleviate the
knowledge problem by directing their activities to a better fulfill-
ment of individuals' preferences.
ple and Market Failure]; Stefan Sinn, The Taming of Leviathan: Competition Among Govern-
ments, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 172 (1992).
10. Extensive theoretical and empirical literature exists in the tradition of the Tie-
bout model. For a survey of this literature, see Keith Dowding, Peter John, & Stephen
Biggs, Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 31 URB. STUD. 767 (1994). But this
discussion has taken place in the special institutional conditions of the United States.
The new approach must be seen as considerably broader. First, not only are public
goods being taken into account, but also law and regulations are as well. Second, com-
petition is not only seen in neo-classical equilibrium thinking, but also as an innovative
experimentation process. The traditional Tiebout approach, therefore, seems to be too
narrow for analyzsing problems that emerge in the context of European integration.
11. James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 243
(1986).
12. JAMES M. BuCHANAN, THE LIMrrs OF LIBERTY- BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIA-
THAN (1975).
13. Id.; 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY. THE POLITICAL OR-
DER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979).
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B. Applying the Market Approach to Interjurisdictional Competition
The market analogy can be applied as follows. 14 The juris-
dictions correspond to the firms in normal markets. They are
the organizations that compete with one another. The govern-
ments of the jurisdictions can be compared with the manage-
ment of firms. They are the agents who should make decisions
in the interest of their principals, including constituents and
capital owners. The products or services of the firms that are
traded on normal markets correspond to the public goods and
services that are provided by the jurisdictions. The latter consists
of infrastructure, the legal system, regulations, social security sys-
tems, and all other forms of economic policies. Instead of
prices, as in normal markets, taxes must be paid. Jurisdictions,
therefore, can be said to compete with complex bundles of pub-
lic goods, services, and taxes. Crucial for creating markets for
public goods/taxes bundles are, first, the right ofjurisdictions to
decide on the content of their bundle and, second, the mobility
of individuals, firms, and factors of production between jurisdic-
tions that allows them to choose between different bundles of-
fered by various jurisdictions. If jurisdictions are seen as territo-
rial multi-product clubs, including club memberships linked
with rights and duties, then the choices of individuals or firms
between different jurisdictions can also be understood as exit
and entry decisions, and the competition processes as competi-
tion among clubs.
The working of competition processes among jurisdictions
can also be analogized to competition among firms in ordinary
markets. Based upon an evolutionary approach to competition
that draws on the basic ideas of Joseph Schumpeter15 and Fried-
rich Hayek,16 competition is seen as a rivaling process in which
competitors are constantly searching for better solutions for
their customers' problems.17 It is important to note that from an
14. For a more detailed application of the market analogy, see Zum Problem, supra
note 9.
15. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THEORIE DER WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG, 5.Aufl.
(Duncker & Humblot 1912) (discussing competition as innovation process).
16. Friedrich A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in NEW STUDIES IN PHI-
LOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed.,
1978).
17. For a discussion on the concept of evolutionary competition that tries to inte-
grate Schumpeterian and Hayekian notions of competition with evolutionary variation-
selection processes, see Wolfgang Kerber, Wettbewerb als Hypothesentest: Eine evolutorische
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evolutionary perspective, the governments of the jurisdictions
have no certain knowledge about the best economic policies to
fulfill their customers' preferences as an attractive location. This
situation is known as Hayek's knowledge problem. 8 Just as firms
must experiment with different products and technologies to
find out how they can solve their customers' problems as good/
cheap as possible, jurisdictions also must try different bundles of
public goods, services, and taxes to attract individuals, firms, or
capital. Jurisdictions that offer more attractive bundles than
their competitors, or produce their public goods and services
more efficiently, would win a competitive advantage leading to
an influx of resources. At the same time, their less successful
competitors would fall back and lose investments, thus implying
incentives to improve their performance such as by learning
from the better economic policies of their competitors, or imita-
tion. 19
Consequently, locational competition among jurisdictions
may be understood as a constant process of parallel experimen-
tation with economic policies such as new institutional arrange-
ments. In this process, new knowledge is generated and spread
by mutually learning how jurisdictions can improve their bun-
dles of public goods, services, and taxes in reference to their
customers' problems." Potential advantages of competition
Konzeption wissenschaffenden Wettbewerbs, in DIMENSIONEN DES WETrBEWERBS: SEINE ROLLE
IN DER ENTSTEHUNG UND AUSGESTALTUNG VON WIRTSCHAFrSORDNUNGEN 29 (K. Delhaes
& U. Fehl eds., 1997). See also Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, Institutional Competi-
tion among Jurisdictions: An Evolutionary Approach, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 193 (1994) (re-
garding competition among jurisdictions). In this approach, competition is under-
stood as a process in which new knowledge is being generated and spread, i.e. innova-
tion-imitation-processes.
18. The Hayekian knowledge problem is crucial for understanding the advantages
of competition and the importance of decentralization. For an elaboration of this
problem and the consequences for economic policy, see Friedrich A. Hayek, Die Irr-
tiimer des Konstruktivismus und die Grundlagen legitimer Kritik geselschaftlicher Gebilde, re-
printed in DIE ANMABUNG VON WISSEN. NEUE FREIBURGER STUDIEN 16 (Wolfgang Kerber
ed., 1970); Manfred E. Streit, Cognition, Competition, and Catallaxy. In Memory of Friedrich
August von Hayek, 4 CONST. POL. ECON. 223 (1993); Viktor Vanberg & James M.
Buchanan, Constitutional Choice, Rational Ignorance and the Limits of Reason, in 10
JAHRBUCH FUR NEUE POLISCHE OKONOMIE 61 (1991).
19. An important problem is how the political institutions within jurisdictions have
to be designed to ensure the appropriate incentives for politicians. This problem will
not be discussed in this Essay.
20. Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 9; Manfred E. Streit, Systemwettbewerb im
europdischen Integrationsproze, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR ERNST-JoAcHIM MESTMACKER: ZUM
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processes among jurisdictions may not only be the generation of
innovations in the sphere of public goods and services, but also
the control of the power of governments. It has been suggested
that interjurisdictional competition may also help to solve rent-
seeking problems 21 because losers of rent-seeking games are able
to leave their respective jurisdictions and choose jurisdictions
with less rent-seeking.22 An important advantage in contrast to
collective decisions about economic policies in the political sys-
tem of jurisdictions may be the lack of "rational ignorance" be-
cause individual choice between different bundles of jurisdic-
tions maintains the incentives to invest in information about dif-
ferent jurisdictions' offers. Individuals, therefore, directly
control the performance of jurisdictions regarding the fulfill-
ment of their preferences, a concept known as voting by feet.
C. Problems of Market Failure
The basic problem is how to ensure that competition
processes are working in a manner such that the results of in-
terjurisdictional competition are really fulfilling the individuals'
preferences so as to avoid market failure. Since many kinds of
market failure might exist in ordinary markets, it is not surpris-
ing that an extensive discussion has developed about potential
failures of competitive processes among jurisdictions, thus lead-
ing to a wide spectrum of opinions about the feasibility of these
competition processes.2"
One of the central problems is determining whether in-
terjurisdictional competition, with regard to regulations, would
lead to a "race to the bottom." A race to the bottom is a compe-
tition process among regulations in which only the lowest stan-
SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG 521 (U. Immenga, W. M6schel, & D. Reuter eds., 1996);
Vanberg & Kerber, supra note 17.
21. Stefan Sinn, supra note 9.
22. Viktor Vanberg, Systemtransformation, Ordnungsevolution und Protektion: Zum
Problem der Anpassung von Wirtschaftssystemen an ihre Umwelt, in INSTrruTIONELLE
PROBLEME DER SYSTEMTRANSFORMA-ION 11 (D. Cassel ed., 1997).
23. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 9; Breton I, supra note 8; Breton II, supra
note 8; DYE, supra note 8; Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 9; FREY, supra note 1; Gatsios
& Holmes, supra note 9; Hauser & H6sli, supra note 9; Kenyon & Kincaid, supra note 8;
Zum Problem, supra note 9; Erfordern Globalisierung, supra note 9; Oates, supra note 9;
Oates & Schwab, supra note 9; LOCAnONAL COMPETITON IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
(Horst Siebert ed., 1995); Siebert & Koop, supra note 9; Limits to Competition, supra note
9; Sinn, supra note 3; Hans-Werner Sinn, supra note 9; Selection Principle and Market
Failure, supra note 9; Stefan Sinn, supra note 9.
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dards survive, and would not fulfill the preferences of the indi-
viduals. 24 It has been argued that regulatory competition, which
should solve problems of adverse selection, can itself suffer from
problems of adverse selection, thus leading to inefficient low reg-
ulations. 25 But in discussions regarding the so-called "Delaware
effect," it is highly disputed whether competition among corpo-
rate laws of different U.S. states has led to an inefficient low de-
gree of regulation or, as more recent studies suggest, to a con-
stant process of institutional innovations that must be assessed
positively.26 Other studies about regulatory competition also
found that a "race to the top" exists.2 7 Although it seems that
there does not need to be a race to the bottom, the question of
whether the regulations that survive in competition processes
among jurisdictions are really the superior regulations in terms
of the individuals' preferences is very important, and cannot be
answered without further extensive research.
A difficult problem that has extensive literature is determin-
ing whether tax competition leads to efficient outcomes or re-
sults in predatory competition. It has been contended that tax
competition under certain conditions might lead to an under-
provision of public goods and/or too low a degree of redistribu-
tion.28 Depending on the type of taxes and other assumptions of
the models, very different results can be deduced, thus exempli-
fying the complexity of this problem.29
24. See generally Gatsios & Holmes, supra note 9; Hauser & H6sli, supra note 9;
Horst Siebert, The Harmonization Issue in Europe: Prior Agreement or Competitive Process?, in
THE COMPLETION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 53-75 (Horst Sievert ed., 1990); Siebert &
Koop, supra note 9; Jeanne-Mey Sun & Jacques Pelkmans, Regulatory Competition in the
Single Market, 33 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 67 (1995); STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN MARKET: CENTRALIZATION OR COMPETITION AMONG NATIONAL RULES (1994).
25. Limits to Competition, supra note 9; Selection Principle and Market Failure, supra
note 9.
26. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974); Hanno Merkt, Das Europaische Geseltschaflsrecht und die Idee des
"Wettbezwerbs der Cesetzgeber", 59 RABELSZ 545 (1995); Roberta Romano, The State Competi-
tion Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 709 (1987); Roberta Romano, Competi-
tion for State Corporation Law, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 364 (P. Newman ed., 1998).
27. This is known as the "California effect." See Philipp Genschel & T. Plfimper,
Regulatory Competition and International Co-operation, 4J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 4, 626 (1997);
DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1995).
28. Limits to Competition, supra note 9.
29. See, e.g., Hans-Werner Sinn, Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe, 34
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Free migration can lead to problems for the competing ju-
risdictions' redistribution policies through effects of adverse se-
lection. 0 Other problems can be the existence of technological
external effects that might lead to inefficient outcomes if they
transcend the boundaries of the respective jurisdictions (spil-
lovers) .31 Additionally, the problem of restraints of interjurisdic-
tional competition, through harmonization (i.e., cartelization)
or centralization of certain tasks, for example, must be taken
into account.3 2 An especially difficult problem is mobility itself
because exit costs can be different and can lead to the possibility
of immobile individuals who might not be able to gain from the
advantages of competition processes among jurisdictions.
D. A Framework of Rules for Interjurisdictional Competition
Applying the market approach to jurisdictions results in
many problems that cannot be deemed negligible. The question
is determining which conclusions to draw from potential market
failures. At first sight, it seems that problems of interjurisdic-
tional competition might lead to the conclusion that the idea of
applying the market approach to jurisdictions might itself be
wrong. This conclusion, however, would imply either giving up
mobility between jurisdictions or eliminating decentralization.
And from a methodological point of view, the choice is not lim-
ited to the alternatives of competition or non-competition, re-
spectively decentralization or centralization/harmonization.
Rather, the adequate strategy is to ask whether an institutional
framework might exist for those competition processes that help
avoid problems of market failure. This conclusion stems from a
central hypothesis of institutional economics 33 that most market
failures have their causes in inadequate institutional arrange-
EUR. ECON. REV. 489 (1990); A. Wagener, INTERNATIONALER STEUERWETTBEWERB MIT
KAPITALSTEUERN (1997); David E. Wildasin, Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Exter-
nality and a Corrective Subsidy, 25J. URB. ECON. 193 (1989); George R. Zodrow & Peter
Mieszkowski, Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods,
19J. URB. ECON. 356 (1986).
30. A. Dercks, Redistributionspolitik undfdderale Ordnung, Kiln (1996); Limits to Com-
petition, supra note 9.
31. Ngo van Long & Horst Siebert, Institutional Competition Versus ex-ante Harmoniza-
tion: The Case of Environmental Policy, 147J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 296 (1991).
32. Vanberg & Kerber, supra note 17, at 215.
33. The property rights theory is an example of a central hypothesis of institu-
tional economics.
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ments and hence can be eliminated, or at least alleviated, by a
better specification of property rights. The next step, therefore,
should be to look for rules for interjurisdictional competition
that help solve the various problems of potential market failure.
The question of whether the market approach must be aban-
doned should only arise if there is no set of rules that solves the
emerging problems.
But even if designing adequate institutional arrangements
cannot eliminate all inefficiencies, the conclusion to abandon
decentralization or mobility is still not reached. A comparative
institution approach,34 in which the costs of market failure are
weighed against the costs of all problems linked to centralization
or abandonment of mobility, should instead be applied. Since
experience shows that collective decision-making implies large
costs such as knowledge, rent-seeking problems, inefficiencies,
or inflexibility, it might be that considerable costs through mar-
ket failure must also be accepted before it is advisable to turn to
centralization or mobility barriers. The necessary and promising
research strategy therefore lies in applying a comparative institu-
tion approach in searching for appropriate sets of rules that
channel the competition processes among jurisdictions toward a
better fulfillment of individuals' preferences. These considera-
tions strongly suggest that as normal markets need an underly-
ing institutional structure with property rights and competition
rules, markets for public goods and services also need a frame-
work of rules that jurisdictions must observe. 5
In the following Section, it is impossible to show how such a
framework of rules should look. The various problems are too
difficult to discuss briefly, and for most problems a lot of re-
search is still necessary before reliable answers are possible. But
the basic idea of the market approach to jurisdictions cannot be
understood properly if the concept of interjurisdictional compe-
tition is not outlined as a concept that implies a multi-level sys-
tem of jurisdictions and therefore also draws on important in-
sights of the economic theory of fiscal federalism.36
34. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12J.L. & ECON. 1
(1969).
35. See, e.g., Siebert & Koop, supra note 9, at 455; Vanberg & Kerber, supra note 17,
at 280.
36. See generally F6DERALISMUS (G. Kirsch, ed. 1977); RaicARD M. BIRD, FEDERAL
FINANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVE (Can. Tax Found., 1986); Breton I, supra note 8;
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E. A Multi-Level System of Competing Jurisdictions and the Problem
of the Vertical Allocation of Competences
Since the benefits of public goods spread differently locally,
regionally, nationally, or beyond, the existence of a differenti-
ated multi-level system ofjurisdictions, such as municipalities, re-
gions, EC Member States, and the EC, seems necessary. The the-
ory of fiscal federalism developed a set of criteria for the vertical
assignment of competences to various levels of a federal multi-
level system of jurisdictions, including spillover effects, econo-
mies of scale, heterogeneity of preferences, and transaction
costs.37 Within such a system, the jurisdictions on all levels com-
pete with their competitors on the same level, with the exception
of the top level. Since the vertical assignment of competences
determines which problems must be solved on the respective
levels ofjurisdictions, it also defines which economic policies the
jurisdictions can use in their competition with other jurisdictions
on these levels. In such a multi-level system of jurisdictions, par-
allel experimentation processes to improve the performance of
the jurisdictions take place simultaneously on all levels."8 An im-
portant precondition for such a system to work is the observance
of the principle of fiscal equivalence, 9 which also implies that
jurisdictions on all levels have the competence for taxation to
decide their revenues and expenditures themselves.
Shifting competences from higher to lower levels in a hier-
archical system of jurisdictions has considerable impact on the
extent of competition within such a system. If a certain task is
shifted from the national level to a lower level, such as regions or
municipalities, then additional competitive processes among ter-
ritorial sub-units concerning finding better ways to fulfill the task
are possible. If, conversely, competences are shifted upwards,
then the advantage of experimenting for better solutions is dis-
carded. Because of the additional knowledge-creating effect of
competition as a "discovery procedure," another argument for
further decentralization in federally-organized jurisdictions can
Breton II, supra note 8; DYE, supra note 8; WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM
(1972).
37. OATES, supra note 36; Breton I, supra note 8, at 184.
38. Zum Problem, supra note 9.
39. Mancur Olson, Jr., Strategic Theory and Its Applications-The Principle of "Fiscal
Equivalence". The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government, 59 AM.
ECON. REv. 479 (1969).
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be derived that goes even beyond the above mentioned criteria
of fiscal federalism.4 ° The more decentralized such a system of
jurisdictions is, the greater the openness of the system for experi-
mentation with bundles of public goods, services, and taxes, and
the lower the risk of getting stuck with wrong economic policies
because errors tend to be corrected more easily. Since these ex-
perimentation processes are controlled by interjurisdictional
competition, a constant stream of innovative improvements of
institutions and other economic policies can be expected.4
Centralization of competences, however, would eliminate knowl-
edge-creating competition processes and ultimately lead to cen-
tralized decisions about presumably homogeneous bundles of
public goods and services throughout all jurisdictions. It can be
expected that both the regional heterogeneity of preferences
and local knowledge about specific problems and their adequate
solutions will be neglected because knowledge on the central
level will necessarily be limited.4 2
Since the institutional structure of such a system ofjurisdic-
tions must be viewed in the long run, another important dimen-
sion must be taken into account.4 3 Deduced from the criteria of
the economic theory of federalism, including the knowledge-cre-
ating effect of experimentation, it might be conceivable to find
an optimal structure of jurisdictions with an appropriate assign-
40. Wolfgang Kerber & Viktor Vanberg, Competition Among Institutions: Evolution
Within Constraints, in COMPETITION AMONG INSTITUTIONS 35, 47 (L. Gerken ed., 1995);
Martti Vihanto, Competition Between Local Governments as a Discovery Procedure, 148J. INST.
& THEORETICAL ECON. 411, 415 (1992).
41. Legal scholars have also stressed the positive effects of experimentation
processes in the sphere of law, and have elaborated the potential dangers of uniformity
of law through harmonization. See, e.g., Peter Behrens, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen der
Rechtsfortbildung durch Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 50 RABEISZ 19 (1986); Kirchner II, supra
note 3; Kirchner III, supra note 3; Hein Kotz, Rechtsvereinheitlichung-Nutzen, Kosten,
Methoden, Ziele, 50 RABELSZ 1 (1986); Karl M. Meessen, Competition of Competition Laws,
10 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 17 (1989); F. Parisi & L.E. Ribstein, Choice of Law, in 1 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 236 (P. Newman ed., 1998).
For an analysis of potential advantages of varieties of law from an economic perspective,
see Wolfgang Kerber, Rechtseinheitlichkeit und Rechtvielfalt aus okonomischer Sicht, in Sys-
TEMBILDUNG UND SYSTEMLUCKEN IN KERNGEBIETEN DER HARMONISIERUNG. EUROPMJSCHES
SCHULDVERTRAGS UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (S. Grundmann ed., forthcoming 1999).
42. Hayek's argument that the dispersed local knowledge in society cannot be cen-
tralised in one agency, which has been his main argument against the possibility of a
centrally planned economy, can be applied to this problem as well. See Friedrich A.
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519 (1945); see also Breton II,
supra note 8, 185.
43. See Zum Problem, supra note 9; Kirchner III, supra note 3, at 78.
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ment of competences to the different levels of jurisdictions for a
given moment. But in the long run both new problems will
emerge, and new techniques of problem-solving by economic
policies will also be created, implying changes in the optimal
structure of jurisdictions, or at least the optimal assignment of
competences to the various levels of jurisdictions. For example,
technological innovations might reduce economies of scale in
the provision of certain public goods, or the regional heteroge-
neity of preferences might change, both leading to recommen-
dations of shifting tasks to lower or higher levels. The problem,
therefore, must be solved as to how the structure of jurisdictions
and its vertical assignment of competences are adapted to ever-
changing circumstances and problems. Who has the compe-
tence to decide the assignment of competences in such a system
of jurisdictions? Or stated otherwise, who has the competence-
competence?
Two extreme cases can be differentiated. In the first case,
the competence-competence lies on the central level. In this
top-down approach, a centralized decision will be made about
the assignment of competences to all other levels of jurisdic-
tions. Hence, it would be decided centrally on the optimal de-
gree of decentralization. In the second extreme case, the lowest
jurisdictions, municipalities, have the competence-competence,
and they decide whether they want to shift competences to the
next higher level of jurisdictions. In this bottom-up approach,
there are decentralized decisions on the optimal degree of cen-
tralization. The decisive point is that in the second case the con-
stituents of the lower jurisdictions have the right to transfer com-
petences back to the lower level if they think they are better able
to fulfill the respective task.4 4 Another important difference is
that those decentralized decisions about shifting tasks to lower
or higher levels will be controlled by the competition processes
among jurisdictions. This situation is not the case for central-
44. A very interesting example of a bottom-up approach is Frey and
Eichenberger's FOCJ-concept. Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, FOCJ: Competitive
Governments for Europe, 16 IrT'L Rxv. L. & ECON. 315 (1996); Frey & Eichenberger, supra
note 9; FREY, supra note 1. In this stimulating concept of "functional, overlapping, com-
peting jurisdictions" ("FOCJ"), the lower-level jurisdictions have the right to secede
from higher-level jurisdictions, thus leading to the possibility of a territorial restructur-
ing of jurisdictions. Beyond that, Frey and Eichenberger introduce the possibility of
functional federalism as an important additional way of decentralization.
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ized decisions about competence assignments. The compe-
tence-competence assignment on lower levels might help to
avoid tendencies toward over-centralization. In any case, it is not
enough simply to establish an optimal system of jurisdictions
with an optimal vertical assignment of competences. It is also
necessary to have a system of procedural rules in order to adapt
to changing circumstances.
F. Conclusions
These considerations imply that a highly decentralized com-
petitive jurisdictional system might have a superior capability for
innovative development of institutional arrangements and eco-
nomic policies, and hence can adapt more flexibly to new
emerging problems. This conclusion might be especially true if
the competence-competence exists at lower jurisdictional levels.
In a decentralized system, errors in the sense of wrong economic
policies tend to be automatically eliminated by the competitive
jurisdictional processes themselves. In a centralized system, how-
ever, institutional innovations and the elimination of errors tend
to be much more difficult because the necessary collective deci-
sions at the central political level are much slower and lead to
inefficient results. If we are convinced that we really know which
economic policies will best solve our problems, and that the rec-
ommended policies will also be implemented adequately by the
politicians on the central level, then a more centralized system
might be advisable. But if we are skeptical regarding both issues,
and simultaneously think that we are living in a dynamic world
with the constant emergence of new problems for which we still
have to look for new solutions, then a more decentralized, com-
petitive, and therefore innovative and flexible system of jurisdic-
tions might be superior in the long run.
The basic preconditions for a functioning competitive juris-
diction, however, are decentralization of economic policies and
mobility. But due to often considerable exit costs for many indi-
viduals, mobility seems to be limited, thus strengthening the ju-
risdictional monopolistic power over individuals. Political
jurisdictional competition and constitutional constraints on gov-
ernmental powers are therefore necessary, showing that jurisdic-
tional competition can only be seen as a complement, and not as
a substitute, to democratic political systems within competingju-
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risdictions. But it is important to see that the size of mobility
costs is not given exogenously and, instead, depends on the insti-
tutional structure of the system itself. Removing obstacles to mo-
bility, such as a mutual recognition of qualifications, reduces
mobility costs. The mobility costs are also dependent upon the
degree of decentralization. The more decentralized a system of
competing jurisdictions is, the shorter the distance to other juris-
dictions with different bundles of public goods, services, and
taxes is, implying lower costs of mobility. In any case, rules that
protect the right to exit and remove obstacles to mobility are
necessary.
Jurisdictional competition may have similar positive effects
in the form of new generations of innovations and control of
monopolistic market power, as competition processes in ordi-
nary markets. Multi-level systems of competing jurisdictions,
therefore, may be especially innovative and highly adaptive to
newly emerging problems. Many problems of potential market
failures may arise on the other side, however, creating the neces-
sity for a framework of rules for jurisdictional competition
processes to ensure an appropriate working of these markets for
public goods and services. Much research still must be con-
cluded to find out which set of rules would be most appropriate.
III. INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. A Competitive System of Jurisdictions as an Internal Market for
Public Goods
The implications of the establishment of a competitive sys-
tem of jurisdictions within the EC can be expressed thusly: if
jurisdictions produce their public goods and services competi-
tively within the EC, then an "internal market" also develops for
public goods and services. The main difference between normal
markets for private versus public goods and services is that it is
the customers, not the goods and services, that are mobile. The
establishment of interjurisdictional competition, with its provi-
sion of productive locations, therefore, can also be seen as an
extension of the Internal Market Program and, hence, as an ad-
ditional application of the principle of competition in the EC.
Consequently, the opportunity arises for a large part of the pub-
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lic goods and services that are being produced within the EC,
including legal structures and regulations, to be provided less
monopolistically and more competitively. The existence and
working of such an internal market for public goods and services
would depend on the degree of mobility of firms, individuals,
and resources within the EC, the extent of decentralization of
decisions on the supply of public goods and services, and the
framework of EC rules for competition processes within the EC.
B. An Integrated System of Competition Rules for Firms
and Jurisdictions
The existing system of competition rules within the EC is
based upon Article 3 (g) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty"), which demands "a system ensuring
that competition in the internal market is not distorted."4 6 The
European competition rules encompass mainly Articles 81
through 89 of the EC Treaty.4" Whereas Articles 81, 82, and the
Merger Regulation address restrictions of competition by private
undertakings on normal markets, such as horizontal and vertical
agreements, abuse of dominant positions, and mergers,4 8 Arti-
cles 86 through 89 address policies of Member States.49 Article
86 ensures that the rules of competition apply equally to public
undertakings in the public sector of Member States and there-
fore has been used for deregulation to break up national mo-
nopolies.50 Articles 87 through 89 of the EC Treaty should pre-
vent Member States from distorting competition by granting
state aid to domestic firms giving them a competitive advantage
compared to their competitors from other Member States. 1 An
important part of the system of competition rules are also the
judgments of the European Court of Justice regarding Article 28
45. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
TEU, supra note 2.
46. Id. art. 3(g), n.J. C 224/1, at 8 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589.
47. Id. arts. 85-94, n.J. C 224/1, at 28-31 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-32.
48. Id. arts. 85-86, n.J. C 224/1, at 28-29 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28.
49. Id. arts. 90-94, n.J. C 224/1, at 29-31 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 629-32; VAt-
ENTINE KoR-m, AN INTRODUCTORY GuIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAw AND PRA'CE (5th
ed. 1994).
50. EC Treaty, supra note 45, art. 90, O.J. C 224/1, at 29-30 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 629.
51. Id. arts. 92-94, OJ. C 224/1, at 30-31 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630-32.
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of the EC Treaty in the famous "Cassis de Dijon" decision,52 and
the Internal Market Program, which helped remove obstacles to
the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital.
An analysis of the types of competition processes that are
protected by EC rules of competition shows that the rules refer
to competition processes among firms in markets for private
goods and services.53 Although the rules also fight against cer-
tain kinds of economic policies of Member States, they do this
only with regard to their distorting effect on competition be-
tween firms. But the EC rules of competition do not refer to
interjurisdictional competition. They are not rules that deter-
mine which behavior of Member States is allowed or forbidden
in competition among themselves. The objective of the rules is,
rather, to ensure that Member States do not impede competi-
tion on the internal markets for private goods. Consequently,
competition between Member States and other lower-level juris-
dictions is not taken into account in the European system of
competition rules.5 4
On the contrary, it can be argued that the omission of refer-
ences to interjurisdictional competition tends to lead to an appli-
cation of the existing rules on competition among firms, which
threatens to impede the competitive processes among jurisdic-
tions. An interesting example is the EC policy on state aids. 5
52. Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein, Case 120/78, [1979]
E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494.
53. Beyond that, the basic freedoms of persons and capital are ensuring competi-
tion processes on factor markets such as labor and capital markets.
54. Some authors analyzing regional policy have seen the problem of ignoring lo-
cational competition. In this context, approaches of competition among regions as an
alternative to traditional regional policy have been developed. See, e.g., J. Franke, Die
Regionalpolitik der Europdischen Gemeinschafi: Eine theoretische und empirische Analyse ihres
Wirkungsgrades und der Entwurf eines Systems konkurrierender Regionen als Ergdnzung zur
Strategie der Marktintegration in der Geneinschaft (1989); K. Lammers, Die europdische
Beihilfenaufsicht im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wettbewerbsziel und Kohdsionsanliegen, in WIRT-
SCHAFrSDIENST 509 (1996); U. van Suntum, Regionalpolitik in der Marktwirtschafl.
Fremdkiiper oder notwendige Ergdnzung?, in JAH-RBUCH FUR REGIONALWISSENSCHAFr 110
(1984).
55. For a thorough analysis of the EC policy on state aids, see G. Firber, BIN-
NENMARKTGERECHTE SUBVENTIONSPOLITIK IN DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION; STRUKTUREN,
NORMEN UND DEFIZITE (1995); M. ROSENSTOCK, DIE KONTROLLE UND HARMONISIERUNG
NATIONALER BEIHILFEN DURCH DIE KoMMISSION DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFrEN
(1995). For a more detailed analysis of the following argument, see Wolfgang Kerber,
Die EU-Beihilfenkontrole als Wettbewerbsordnung: Probleme aus der Perspektive des Wettbewerbs
zwischen Jurisdiktionen, in EUROPAISCHE INTEGRATION ALS ORDNUNGSPOUTISCHE GESTAi-
TUNGSAUFGABE 37 (D. Cassel ed., 1998).
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From the economic perspective, the EC activities to reduce the
subsidies of Member States are very important and desirable.
But the problem is that there are many, and very tricky, methods
to circumvent the EC control of state aids by granting specific
advantages to firms through the manipulation of real estate
prices, zoning regulations, special rebates from local utilities,
etc. If the Commission wants to prevent these forms of advan-
tages in the context of firm settlements, then it must control all
kinds of jurisdictional policies, and must develop criteria ex-
plaining under what conditions specific municipal policies are
compatible with the Common Market. The consequence would
be that the rights of these jurisdictions to decide freely on their
policies, including public goods and services, would be restricted
considerably and their possibilities to experiment with new kinds
of policies to improve the conditions of their location would be
strongly reduced. Although the basic objective of the EC state
aids policy might be desirable, a problem arises because the sub-
sequent application of the rules might lead to an unintended
centralization of policies of lower-level jurisdictions, and hence
impede innovative competition processes among those jurisdic-
tions."
The problem can also be explained in a more general
form." If the elimination of competitive distortions means that
competition between firms must proceed entirely uninfluenced
by economic policies of jurisdictions within the EC, and differ-
ent cost conditions between Member States are only allowed due
to differences in "natural conditions," then the effects of policies
of lower-level jurisdictions on the competition between firms
must be neutralized through, for example, centralization or har-
monization of those policies within the EC. This problem is not
limited to state aids granting selective advantages to firms. Addi-
tionally, movements among the tax rate, educational level (re-
sulting in a more productive workforce), or infrastructures and,
therefore, each improvement of local jurisdictional conditions,
leads to a competitive advantage for firms that are established in
the jurisdiction, as compared to firms in other jurisdictions.5" If
56. Kerber, supra note 55, at 52.
57. Id. at 56.
58. The EC does not actually go that far in the interpretation of "distortion of
competition," but it is not easy to argue what the difference is with regard to this type of
"distortion" between a specific tax reduction for a domestic firm, which is a prohibited
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an undistorted competition between firms implies the need for
firms throughout the EC to face the same economic policies59 to
prevent competitive advantages over firms that have their cause
in economic policies of certain jurisdictions, then ultimately
there must be a "leveling of the playing field" in which the eco-
nomic policies of all jurisdictions within the EC are standardized
and, therefore, decentralization is abolished.
But this consequent interpretation of "undistorted competi-
tion" leads to the abolition of any meaningful form of decentrali-
zation, implying the complete elimination of any interjurisdic-
tional competition by experimenting with different forms of
bundles of public goods, institutions, and taxes for the improve-
ment of locational conditions. The permission of heterogeneity
concerning jurisdictional economic policies is a necessary re-
quirement for the workability of interjurisdictional competition
with the potential effect of innovations and the control of gov-
ernmental power. If lower-level jurisdictions, however, still have
competences on deciding freely on their economic policies,
then interjurisdictional competition as a constant process of ex-
perimentation and, therefore, productive locational competi-
tion, would be possible. But then the firms would face different
locational conditions that are not only caused by differences in
"natural conditions," but also by different economic policies of
lower-level jurisdictions. A tension, thus, appears to exist be-
tween undistorted competition among firms on the European
markets for private goods and interjurisdictional competition on
the European markets for public goods and services.
The problem, rather, lies in the narrow interpretation of
"undistorted competition," which is not more appropriate within
a competitive system of jurisdictions in which economic policies
of jurisdictions are controlled by competition, and mobility be-
tween jurisdictions is ensured. First, different local jurisdictional
conditions do not lead to competitive distortions between firms
in the long run if firms can freely decide on the location of their
investments in the EC. If all firms have the right to settle in each
subsidy, EC Treaty, supra note 45, art. 87(1), O.J. C 224/1, at 29 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 628, and a general reduction of taxes by a Member State, because the latter
leads to the same competitive advantage of domestic firms in relation to competitors of
other Member States that do not get the advantages of lower taxes.
59. Such economic policies, including laws, regulations, and taxes, consist of the
same level of public goods and services.
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jurisdiction within the EC and, therefore, to use locational ad-
vantages, then the decision to stay in jurisdictions with less at-
tractive conditions, presumably leading to higher costs, or move
to more attractive jurisdictions, freely belongs to the firm. Sec-
ond, in a competitive system of jurisdictions, the economic poli-
cies of the jurisdictions are no longer the result of states that
have access to nearly unlimited tax revenues because of their
monopolistic state power. Rather, the jurisdictions and their
policies, including taxes, are controlled by competition. It is
possible that this result would considerably limit the scope of dis-
torting subsidies and other favors to specific firms.
Interjurisdictional competition and competition between
firms therefore do not contradict each other. But the criterion
of "undistorted competition" must be applied in such a differen-
tiated manner that interjurisdictional competition, which neces-
sarily must lead to heterogeneity among economic policies in EC
jurisdictions, can work in a sufficient way. This reasoning cer-
tainly does not imply that there should be no rules that constrain
the economic policies of jurisdictions. On the contrary, Part II
argued that rules for the avoidance of market failure in competi-
tion would be necessary. The problem, rather, is that an inte-
grated set of rules for competition within the EC is needed to
ensure both competition among firms in markets for private
goods and competition among firms in markets for public
goods.6
C. The Problem of Regulatory Competition
National regulations, such as consumer protection regula-
tions, have been interpreted as non-tariff barriers to trade and
therefore have been attacked by the European Court of Justice
as being prohibited by Article 28 of the EC Treaty.6 1 The intro-
duction of the "principle of origin," or "mutual recognition," has
60. The search for such an integrated set of rules may lead to new and currently
unknown problems. A deeper analysis, for example, might raise fundamental questions
regarding the compatibility of decentralization and mobility. The possibility that mean-
ingful decentralization might imply phenomena, which usually will be diagnosed as bar-
riers to mobility, cannot be excluded. For a more thorough but still very preliminary
analysis, see Zum Problem, supra note 9; John Kincaid, Liberty, Competition, and the Rise of
Coercion in American Federalism, in COMPETMON AMONG INSTITUTIONS 259 (L. Gerken
ed., 1995); Viktor Vanberg, Subsidiarity, Responsive Covernment and Individual Liberty, in
UBERLEGUNGEN ZUR SUBSIDIARITAT 255 (K. W. N6rr & T. Oppermann eds., 1996).
61. See EC Treaty, supra note 45, art. 30, O.J. C 224/1, at 15 (1992), [1992] 1
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resulted in firms from various Member States, whose products
conform with their country's regulations, having the right to sell
their products in all other Member States as well, even if they do
not conform with domestic regulations.62 All Member States,
therefore, offer products to the consumers with different na-
tional regulations, thus leading to competition among national
regulation systems because consumers can choose between dif-
ferent products of firms with different national regulations. This
situation has been interpreted as competition among regula-
tions, or regulatory competition, and an intense discussion has
emerged as to whether these competition processes lead to desir-
able or defective results, i.e., a "race to the bottom" problem.63
"Regulatory competition" raises many difficult questions, which
suggest that the consequences of introducing the "mutual recog-
nition" principle might be misinterpreted if it is viewed as an
example for decentralized decisions on regulations, and compe-
tition among decentralized regulations, and if the rule of origin
is seen as an appropriate meta-rule for regulatory competition
among jurisdictions.6 4
The objective of most of these regulations has been con-
sumer protection. For example, information asymmetries be-
tween producers and consumers concerning the quality of con-
sumer goods might lead to the problem of adverse selection.
This problem can result in a market breakdown for high quality
products because consumers might not be able to distinguish be-
tween products with high and low quality. Introducing
mandatory rules that ensure minimum quality standards might
C.M.L.R. at 602 ("Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect... shall be prohibited between Member States.").
62. For descriptions and analysis of the very different developments, see P. Bern-
hard, "Keck" und "Mars"-die neueste Rechtsprechung des EuGH zu Art.30 EGV, in
EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFS-UND STEUERRECHT 404 (1995); DINNAGE &
MURPHY, supra note 5; Mortelsman, supra note 5; P.-Ch. Mfiller-Graff, Kommentierung von
Art.30, in 1 KOMMENTAR ZUM EU/EG-VERTRAG 631 (H. Groeben, J. Thiesing, & C.-D.
Ehlermann eds., 5th ed. 1997); Rohe, supra note 3, at 12; Slot, supra note 5; Streit &
Mussler, supra note 5; Manfred E. Streit & Werner Mussler, Wettbewerb der Systeme und das
Binnenmarktprogramm der Eurapaischen Union, in EUROPA ZWISCHEN ORDNUNG-
SWETTBEWERB UND HARMONISIERUNG 75 (L. Gerken ed., 1995); Sun & Pelkmans, supra
note 24; Stephen Weatherill, After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification,
33 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 885 (1996); Weatherill & Beaumont, supra note 5.
63. Gatsios & Holmes, supra note 9; Hauser & H6sli, supra note 9; Siebert, supra
note 24; Siebert & Koop, supra note 9; Sun & Pelkmans, supra note 24; WOoLcoCK,
supra note 24.
64. For greater detail regarding the following argument, see Kerber, supra note 41.
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solve this problem.6 5 Since the market failure has its cause in
consumer information deficiencies, the rules about minimum
standards must be mandatory so consumers are only offered
products that conform to those regulations. The problem is that
the national regulations that are competing with one another
after introducing the principle of origin lose their character as
mandatory regulations for consumer protection. If consumers
can choose between different national regulations, then the reg-
ulations are not truly mandatory. The regulations therefore
have changed their character and become mere standards for
producing certain goods. Thus, from the consumer point of
view, different national standards of production compete with
one another. But this simultaneously presupposes that the con-
sumers are able to assess and compare the quality of different
national standards of production. If consumers do not have
enough information for such decisions, then competition
processes among different national standards might lead to mar-
ket failure.66
An additional important consequence of the rule of origin
is that it retains the mandatory character of national regulations
for domestic producers while consumers are allowed to choose
between different national standards. The principle of mutual
recognition, therefore, transforms the national regulations for
consumer protection into national regulations for domestic produ-
cers, an entirely different regulation. The Member States now
determine, with their national regulations, which quality prod-
uct specifications domestic producers can use to compete with
European competitors. It is difficult to conceive how this type of
production regulation can be defended economically. Addition-
ally, this type of production regulation leads to the problem of
"reverse discrimination," as domestic producers have to observe
regulations that their competitors from other Member States do
not have to obey, implying potential competitive distortions.
The introduction of the principle of origin, therefore, has not
led to competition among national regulations for the protec-
tion of consumers, but has led to competition processes among na-
65. See generally JOSEPH E. STrlGLITZ, INFORMATION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1993).
66. But note that the information problem, and therefore the probability of ad-
verse selection, differs considerably if we consider information problems of consumers
with regard to the quality of many particular products or information problems regard-
ing the quality of the entire system of regulations.
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tional regulations for domestic producers, for which hardly any eco-
nomic reasons exist. For competition between domestic produ-
cers, it is important to note that the competitiveness of the
domestic industries becomes the main objective for all endeav-
ors to change the national regulations instead of the protection
of consumers. The danger therefore emerges that these na-
tional regulations are used as instruments of Member State in-
dustrial policies to support the competitiveness of their domestic
industries.
These consequences, as well as potential distortions of com-
petition by reverse discrimination, can be avoided if not only the
consumers, but also the producers can choose between different
national regulations. An example is if German firms can also
produce along French or Italian standards, including the label-
ing requirement, without having to relocate their production fa-
cilities to France or Italy. In this case, an internal market for regula-
tions emerges, in which fifteen national quality standards with
their respective labels would compete for the trust of European
consumers and use by producers throughout the EC. A real
market would develop, in which all "suppliers," i.e., the fifteen
Member States, and all "customers," i.e., directly, the producers,
and indirectly, the consumers, are free in their development of
new quality standards and in their choice between them.67 It is
also possible that innovative competition processes might de-
velop, but now regarding quality standards, and not regulations,
as mandatory rules. From the economic point of view, this type
of competition would have considerable similarities to brand
competition in consumer goods markets. Consequently, this
market solution must be interpreted as deregulatory, which also
must be viewed as the appropriate solution from the economic
perspective, if the consumers are able to assess and compare the
different national standards. And insofar as consumers are
deemed unable to deal adequately with certain information
problems, mandatory regulation might be necessary. But such
rules must be established as mandatory rules on the EC level as,
for example, minimum harmonization.
67. But free entry is still missing on these markets because only the fifteen Member
States would be allowed to offer quality standards. From the economic perspective, it
would be consequent that private firms can also supply such quality standards. See Ker-
ber, supra note 41.
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The result of this very brief reasoning is that the introduc-
tion of the rule of origin, or mutual recognition, does not really
lead to regulatory competition for the goal of consumer protec-
tion. This situation is because the principle of mutual recogni-
tion implies that national regulations are not mandatory any-
more for consumers in the respective Member States. Rather,
there is either competition among mandatory quality regulations
for domestic producers, which from the economic point of view
does not make much sense and can lead to other undesirable
consequences, or a market for quality standards develops if the
producers can also choose among the national quality standards.
But the latter case does not represent competition among regu-
lations; rather it must be interpreted as a pure market for quality
standards and stand for deregulation because no mandatory
rules exist anymore. So regulations for consumer protection can
only exist either as rules on the EC level that are mandatory
throughout the Community, or as rules on the Member States
level-but in the latter case, only the rule of home country con-
trol can ensure the necessary mandatory character of these regu-
lations. Decentralized competences for regulation can only be
viewed in combination with the rule of home country control
because the rule of origin abolishes the right of Member States
to decide decentrally on mandatory regulations for consumers.
From the interjurisdictional competition perspective, there-
fore, only three consistent alternatives regarding regulation
within the EC seem possible, including deregulation (private
market solution), national regulations with "home country con-
trol," and EC regulations, i.e., centralization/harmonization.68
The introduction of the mutual recognition principle does not
seem to be a sustainable alternative but, rather, a very important
principle that sets off a dynamic process of change to break up the
strong tradition of rigid, and often inappropriate, national regu-
lations, leading to either deregulation or harmonization. This
dynamic process of reshuffling regulation problems between the
three alternatives is still going on. The introduction of the rule
of origin should therefore not be seen as a meta-rule for regula-
68. Any form of minimum harmonization with the possibility of stricter national
regulations, combined with the principle of mutual recognition, may be a viable polit-
ical compromise. But such a form suffers from similar difficulties and contradictions
because the stricter national regulations can also only have the character of regulations
for domestic producers, as argued above.
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tory competition, but as a cause that triggers off a process of
reallocation of competences for regulation between the three
poles of national regulation, EC regulation, and deregulation
(market solution).
If centralization or harmonization of regulations is undesir-
able because of the lacking regional differentiation among EC
regulations for fulfilling different constituent preferences, or be-
cause of the long-run advantages of experimentation with regu-
lations, then decentralized forms of regulation and an appropri-
ate form of regulatory competition might be recommended.
This Essay does not provide an answer about the necessary
framework of rules for such solutions, but the rule of origin does
not seem to be the appropriate answer. Additionally, it is not
possible in this Essay to elaborate on what regulatory competi-
tion might really mean in the concept of interjurisdictional com-
petition. The intent of these considerations is to show that the
problem of regulatory competition is much more complex than
has been seen up until now.
D. The Problem of the Vertical Allocation of Competences in the EC
A competitive system of jurisdictions should be constituted
as a multi-level system ofjurisdictions in which jurisdictions com-
pete with one another on all levels. Crucial to those competition
processes is the vertical allocation of competences for the provi-
sion of public goods and services, regulations, taxation, and
other forms of policies. The economic theory of federalism pro-
vides criteria for how competences should be assigned to the
particular jurisdictional levels, such as spill-over effects, econo-
mies of scale, heterogeneity of preferences, transaction costs,
and learning effects by experimentation. Since decentralization
of competences is a precondition for interjurisdictional competi-
tion, each transfer of competences to higher levels, or especially
to the top-level of such a multi-level system, eliminates competi-
tion processes. Decentralizing competences can therefore be in-
terpreted as a process of competitor cartelization 69 that would
require efficiency gains such as economies of scale, or a solution
for market failures.70
The most apparent dangers for interjurisdictional competi-
69. Stefan Sinn, supra note 9, at 188.
70. Certain similarities to the problem of exemptions from the prohibition of
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tion within the EC, therefore, are all activities that transfer com-
petences from Member States, or more generally, from lower-
level jurisdictions, to the central level of the EC. In the last two
decades, the purposes of the EC in Article 2 of the EC Treaty,71
and the instruments in the form of new EC policies, have both
been widely extended, as exemplified by the long list of "activi-
ties" of the Community in Article 3 of the Treaty.72 Many new
competences have therefore been transferred to the EC. 73 But
the principle of subsidiarity in Article 5 of the EC Treaty has also
been introduced. 4 From an economic point of view, the above
criteria for the economic theory of federalism can be used to
operationalize the principle of subsidiarity. But the problem is
that Article 5 of the EC Treaty is not a legal norm for the general
allocation of competences in the EC but, rather, "its function is
limited to the application in mixed fields of competences."75
Legal scholars, therefore, are very skeptical about the impact of
the principle of subsidiarity in Article 3(b) with regard to the
impediment of over-centralization in the EC.7 6
To what extent the above criteria for the vertical allocation
of competences in the concept of interjurisdictional competition
would lead to a different assignment of competences as they ex-
ist today in the EC cannot be discussed here. An analysis along
these criteria, however, leads to the conclusion that the current
allocation does not correspond to these criteria, presumably sug-
gesting that some competences should be transferred to higher
levels and others to lower levels of jurisdictions.77 But another
agreements restricting competition in Article 85 of the EC Treaty therefore emerge. See
KoRAH, supra note 49, at 63.
71. EC Treaty, supra note 45, art. 2, O.J. C 224/1, at 8 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
588.
72. Id. art. 3, OJ. C 224/1, at 8 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588-89.
73. For a critical analysis of this development, see Manfred E. Streit & Werner
Mussler, Evolution of the Economic Constitution of the European Union, in 2 THE NEw PAL-
GRAVE DiCrioNARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 98 (P. Newman ed., 1998); Streit &
Mussler, supra note 5.
74. EC Treaty, supra note 45, art. 3(b), O.J. C 224/1, at 8 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R_ at 588.
75. Kirchner III, supra note 3, at 75.
76. See Bernard, supra note 3; Emiliou, supra note 3; Homann & Kirchner, supra
note 3; Kirchner I, supra note 3; Kirchner II, supra note 3; Kirchner III, supra note 3;
Koenig & Haratsch, supra note 3; M6schel, supra note 3; Rohe, supra note 3; Sinn, supra
note 3; Steiner, supra note 3; Toth, supra note 3; Van den Bergh, supra note 3.
77. For a more concrete explanation to the questions that should be asked in such
an analysis, see Kirchner I, supra note 3; Kirchner II, supra note 3; Kirchner III, supra
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aspect should also be emphasized from the interjurisdictional
competition perspective. A central task for the EC would be the
provision of the institutional framework that ensures the work-
ing of the multi-level system of jurisdictions and therefore the
necessary rules for competition among lower-level jurisdictions.
Consequently, the extension of purposes and policies on the EC
level does not need to be an impediment to interjurisdictional
competition if the competences for certain economic policies on
the EC level are not used to replace or harmonize lower-level
policies. Rather, it would be understood as the competence to
establish appropriate rules for the respective competition
processes of lower-level jurisdictions. European social policy, for
example, does not need to imply European social security sys-
tems or social standard harmonization, but can also consist of a
framework of rules that focus upon the parallel existence of de-
centralized social security systems. An example of this problem
is the issue caused by migration between Member States.
E. Interjurisdictional Competition as a Concept for
European Integration
The dangers of general harmonization and centralization,
and therefore the transition to a central state, does not seem to
be realistic in the near future, although the tendencies to cen-
tralize still exist and will be fueled by the European Monetary
Union. But the still existing EC decentralization might be
strengthened by the introduction of the subsidiarity principle
and, thus, does not stand on a very strong theoretical basis. In
discussions concerning European integration, decentralization is
not often seen as a constituent part of the integration process
itself, but rather appears as the remainder of national egoisms,
i.e., as the anti-pole of integration. Integration often is associ-
ated with the notion of uniformity, and ultimate integration with
note 3. Also see the proposal of the European Constitutional Group as established
additionally to the Union Court of Justice, a subsidiarity court whose members would
be empanelled from the highest courts of the Member States. The subsidiarity court
would decide exclusively on the division of powers between the Union and the Member
States. Roland Vaubel, The Constitutional Reform of the European Union, 41 EUROPEAN
ECON. RE:v. 443, 448 (1997). See also Thomas Apolte, Secession Clauses: A Tool for the
Taming of an Arising Leviathan in Brussels?, 8 CONST. POL. ECON. 57 (1997) (discussing
problems of secession clauses); Daniela Obradovic, Repatriation of Powers in the European
Community, 34 COMMON MTcr. L. REv. 59 (1997) (discussing possibilities of repatriation
of powers in EC).
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the achievement of the traditional unitary state, only now on the
EC level instead of the national level.
Interjurisdictional competition is different. Decentraliza-
tion is not opposed to integration, but should be understood as
a constituent part of European integration itself. Therefore, the
suggested competitive system of jurisdictions should be viewed as a con-
cept for European integration. It is thus necessary to show which
functions economic decentralization has for the Community.
The contention is that European integration can be much more
successful at fulfilling the preferences of the European constitu-
ents if the strategy to establish a competitive system of jurisdic-
tions is chosen instead of being guided by traditional concepts of
unitary national states.7" This statement does not imply that the
EC would not have many tasks and competences. The EC has
had the huge task of establishing an appropriate framework of
rules to ensure basic freedoms and an internal market for pri-
vate goods and services. The same task would also be necessary
to ensure the proper working of a decentralized system of com-
peting jurisdictions. The basic idea behind this model of inte-
gration is to establish a framework of rules that through compet-
itive experimentation processes allows a high flexibility and
adaptability of both jurisdictional structures and economic poli-
cies, and enables newly emerging problems to be solved more
rapidly and thoroughly. Innovative learning processes, there-
fore, would be institutionalized.
The current hierarchical structure of jurisdictions, consist-
ing of the EC, Member States, and lower-level jurisdictions, can
be viewed as the starting-point for the development of a multi-
level competitive system ofjurisdictions in which the provision of
public goods and services should be assigned as low as possible.
The EC rules for the Common Market would necessarily be an
integrated system of competition rules that would protect both
competition among firms for private goods and interjurisdic-
tional competition for public goods. As a consequence, jurisdic-
tions would compete for most economic policies.7" Only those
economic policies carried out on the EC level would be supplied
78. For a presentation of the idea that institutional competition should be seen as
a concept of European integration, see especially Kirchner III, supra note 3; Streit &
Mussler, supra note 5; Streit & Mussler, supra note 73.
79. See FREv, supra note 1; Streit, supra note 20.
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monopolistically. 80 The main problem is that the concept of in-
terjurisdictional competition, both on theoretical and empirical
grounds, is a rather new approach that still needs much research
work. Especially important is the question of how the competi-
tive system of jurisdictions, consisting of the rules on competi-
tion for both kinds of markets, the structure of the multi-level
system ofjurisdictions including the vertical allocation of compe-
tences, and meta-rules for changing these rules and the structure
of jurisdictions including the problem of "competence-compe-
tence," should be conceived as an integrated and consistent
framework of rules, and therefore as a central part of the Euro-
pean Constitution.
IV. PERSPECTIVES
In economics, states traditionally are viewed as monopolies
that provide their public goods and services unilaterally because
their individuals, firms, and factors of production are seen as im-
mobile. For a long time this monopoly paradigm of economic
policy dominated our thinking about economic state policies. In
the past decade, the mobility of individuals, firms, and capital
has increased considerably and is expected to increase in the fu-
ture as well, and economic state policies have come under com-
petitive pressure. Former monopolistic states seem to change
into mere "locations" that must compete with other locations for
public goods and services. The monopoly paradigm of eco-
nomic policy, therefore, tends to be replaced by a competition
paradigm of economic policy.8 ' This development should be
seen as an opportunity.
Decentralization of economic policies still exists within the
EC to a considerable extent, and the obstacles to mobility have
been reduced dramatically. But interjurisdictional competition
is largely ignored as a logical consequence of the development
of European integration and the concrete application of the EC
Treaty. This occurence is resulting in various tendencies to re-
duce decentralization, and hence to impede interjurisdictional
80. Insofar as mobility exists across the EC borders, competition among jurisdic-
tions may also take place on that level. All these considerations, therefore, can also be
applied to the global level and to the question for the appropriate global framework of
rules.
81. Erfordern Globalisierung, supra note 9.
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competition. The basic problem is not whether we want in-
terjurisdictional competition, but the conclusion is that if we
want simultaneous mobility and decentralization, then we must
accept interjurisdictional competition and we must think about
ways to make competition processes workable. The concept of
interjurisdictional competition suggests that, within an appropri-
ate framework of rules, competition processes might not only be
workable, but also might even lead to more desirable outcomes
regarding the innovative improvement of the provision of public
goods and services, and their efficient production, than tradi-
tional monopoly states. Through the establishment of appropri-
ate rules for a competitive system of jurisdictions, therefore, an
internal market for public goods and services can also develop.
Although competition and the completion of the internal
market are viewed as basic principles of European integration,
locational interjurisdictional competition, and hence markets
for public goods and services, are not yet constituent parts of the
EC. Consequently, the central task for the EC would be the es-
tablishment of a framework of rules that would ensure both com-
petition between firms for the provision of private goods, and
interjurisdictional competition for public goods. The alternative
to this solution would be the simple transfer of the old tradi-
tional monopoly paradigm of economic policy to the EC level,
implying the replacement of centralized nation states by a much
larger centralized Community. If innovativeness, diversity, flexi-
bility, and responsiveness to the preferences of the constituents
within Europe should be maintained, then new concepts must
be developed.
